WHAT IS WAR? TERRORISM AS WAR AFTER 9/11
Jane GillilandDalton*
This paper addresses the topic of terrorism as war after September 11th,
2001. Historically, "war" has generally been considered to be a state of
hostilities between nations characterized by the use of military force. A
declaration of war provided the formal and official announcement that a state
of hostilities existed between two nations-although a state of hostilities
characterized by the use of armed force could exist without a formal
declaration.
In the post-United Nations Charter world, however, what matters is not
whether one nation has declared "war" on another, but rather whether a nation
has been the victim of an armed attack such that it is entitled to respond with
armed force in self-defense. The United Nations Charter, by its terms, does not
require that the armed attack emanate from another nation state. Article 51
provides solely that "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security."' As will be discussed
below, on September 11th, 2001 the United States was the victim of a horrific
armed attack. The United Nations Security Council, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), and the Organization of American States (OAS) all
recognized that the United States was entitled to use force in self-defense in
response to that attack. To provide a more comprehensive analysis of the legal
issues involved, however, it is necessary to begin substantially prior to
September 11th, 2001.
Under the traditional nation-state system, a state of hostilities could exist
between two countries merely upon a declaration of war by one of them,
whether or not armed engagements had actually begun. Consistent with that
practice, one could argue that a state of hostilities existed between the United
States and al Qaeda as early as 1992, when al Qaeda leadership issued a
"fatwa" for jihad against United States forces located in Islamic territory.2 In
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August 1996, Osama bin Laden issued another fatwa declaring war on the
United States. Certainly by 1998, when Osama bin Laden issued his public
Declaration of Jihad against Saudi Arabia and the United States, calling for the
murder of "any American, anywhere on earth" as the "individual duty for every
Muslim,

'3

American leadership would have had grounds to believe that the

country was at "war," based solely on those issued pronouncements.
Particularly when analyzing the 1998 fatwa, one is struck by how truly
monumental is the vision and expansive the goals it espouses. Osama bin
Laden called on Muslims to kill Americans and their allies, civilian and
military, in order to liberate the al Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque in Mecca.
The al Aqsa Mosque is located on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. Despite the
unprecedented withdrawal of Israel from Gaza in the fall of 2005, it is
inconceivable that Israel would peacefully give up the Temple Mount without
a struggle. Thus, bin Laden must have in mind an armed struggle if he intends
to accomplish the objectives of the 1998 fatwa. In fact, the strategic scope of
that fatwa has been compared with the strategic scope of the Russian
revolutionaries or Mao Tse Tung's guerrilla warfare campaigns.4 Accordingly,
it would not have been unrealistic for the United States to acknowledge that war
in the literal sense had in fact been declared on the country based solely on the
statements by Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda leadership, beginning in 1992.
This author believes, however, that when dealing with a non-state actor
more than mere declarations of war are required for a state to be authorized to
respond with military force under the law of armed conflict (as opposed to
dealing with the threat under domestic law enforcement authorities).
Accordingly, one must look not only at the words of the al Qaeda network, but
at its actions as well. Those actions since 1993 leave no doubt that, not only
has war been declared on the United States by words, but the country has been
the victim of an on-going series of attacks that have cost thousands of American
and foreign national lives.
In 1993, Afghan-trained Arab militants attacked the World Trade Center
in New York, killing six and injuring 1000 people. In addition, al Qaeda has
attacked American embassies (Tanzania and Kenya in 1998), warships (USS
THE SULLIVANS and USS COLE in 2000); financial centers (the World
Trade Center in 2001), military headquarters (the Pentagon in 2001), and has
attempted to decapitate the government (by the failed attacks on the White
House and the Capitol in 2001).' Almost 3000 people from over fifty nations
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 59 (2005) [hereinafter 9/11 REPORT].
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died in the attacks of September 1 th-more than were killed in the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor on seven December 1941. There is some evidence al
Qaeda was involved in or inspired the attacks on the Saudi National Guard
facility in Riyadh in 1995, killing five Americans, and in the attack on Khobar
Towers in 1996 that killed nineteen Americans and wounded 372.6 Al Qaeda
is a multi-national enterprise with operations in sixty countries. 7 In light of this
continuing series of attacks, the letter seized in Iraq from Ayman al-Zawahiri
to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, reiterates the strategic nature of the terrorists'
campaign and reminds the world that this armed conflict is continuous and ongoing.8
Misconstruing the scale of terrorism is dangerous and has cost the United
States dearly. The 9/11 Commission Report concluded that "an unfortunate
consequence" of the superb criminal investigative and prosecutorial efforts in
the aftermath of the first World Trade Center bombing, "was that it created an
impression that the law enforcement system was well-equipped to cope with
terrorism." 9
One of the major debates in the post-United Nations Charter world has
been what constitutes an "armed attack"-because under the United Nations
Charter, the question is not whether war has been declared, but whether the
nation has been subject to an armed attack that entitles a response with armed
force in self-defense. In some situations, the answer to that question has not
been clear-cut-as was the case with the Caroline incident during the
Mackenzie Rebellion in Canada in 1839. The diplomatic exchange surrounding
that incident, though it preceded the United Nations Charter, is often cited as
the classic description of an appropriate application of anticipatory self-defense,
in a situation that was not completely clear-cut at the time it occurred.' o
6.

9/11 REPORT, supra note 2, at 60.

7.
Jeffrey De Laurentis, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Civil and
Political Rights, Including the Questions of: Disappearancesand Summary Executions, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2003/G/80, Apr. 22, 2003, at 4 [hereinafter Civil and PoliticalRights].
8.
See, e.g., Douglas Jehl and Thorn Shanker, Al Qaeda Tells Ally In Iraq To Strive ForGlobal
Goals,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7,2005; Susan B. Glasser and Walter Pincus, Seized Letter OutlinesAl QaedaGoals
in Iraq, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2005, p. 13.

9.
9/11 REPORT, supra note 2, at 72. See also Civil and PoliticalRights, supra note 7, at 3 ("Al
Qaida and related terrorist networks are at war against the United States. They have trained, equipped, and
supported armed forces and have planned and executed attacks around the world against the United States
on a scale that far exceeds criminal activity.")
10.
To prevent American sympathizers from using the steamboat Caroline to transport men and
materiel to the Canadian insurgents, British forces boarded the vessel, set it afire, and sent it over Niagara
Falls, killing and injuring several American citizens in the process. When the United States protested the
violation of its sovereignty, the British Government invoked the right of self-defense. Secretary of State
Daniel Webster, in a series of diplomatic notes during 1841-1842, maintained that for the claim of selfdefense to be valid, Great Britain was required to show "a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming,
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But if the United States was unsure prior to September 1Ith, 2001 whether
it had been the victim of an armed attack, there was absolutely no doubt after
that date. NATO invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and the
Organization of American States invoked the equivalent provision, Article 3(1),
of the Rio Treaty, providing that an armed attack against one or more of the
parties shall be considered an attack against them all." United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1368 invoked the inherent right of self-defense. 2 And
President Bush decided that it was time to break with the practice of treating
terrorism as exclusively a criminal offense, and that the United States would
respond with its armed forces and with every instrument of United States
national power.'3 Recall that President Clinton also took military action against
al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan and a chemical facility in Sudan in

leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, &
SELF-DEFENSE 218-19 (2003). Though the Caroline incident stands for the proposition that the right of
anticipatory self-defense has long been recognized as an inherent right, the particular articulation of the
standard (instant, overwhelming, no choice, no moment) has been criticized as too restrictive. Id.
11.
NATO invoked Article 5 on September 12, 2001 but only provisionally, pending verification
that the attacks had been directed from abroad. U.S. Ambassador Frank Taylor briefed the North Atlantic
Council on October 2 on the results of investigations into the attacks. As a result of that information, the
Council determined that the attacks had been carried out by the world-wide terrorist network of al Qaeda,
headed by Osama bin Laden and protected by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. NA TO Update: Invocation
of Article 5 Confirmed-Oct. 2, 2001, available at www.nato.intldocu/updatel200l; Convocation of the
Twenty-Third Meetingof ConsultationofMinistersof ForeignAffairs, OEA/SerG, CP/RES. 796(1293/01),
Sept. 19,2001; Convocation of the Twenty-Fourth Meeting of Consultation ofMinisters of Foreign Affairs
to Serve as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of ReciprocalAssistance,
OEA/Ser G, CP/RES. 797 (1293/01), Sept. 19, 2001.
12.
S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/508/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001). It could be argued that the
resolution's recognition of "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense" proves that the Security
Council recognizes the war on terrorism as an international armed conflict. This author does not find that
analysis dispositive.
13.
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas J. Feith, Remarks to the Policy Union, University
of Chicago (Apr. 14, 2004), availableat www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/sp20040414-0261.html (last
visited Mar. 10, 2006) ("The President's most basic decision after 9/11 was how to think about the attack.
Keep in mind that for years Americans were hit by terrorists. There were hijackings, murders and bombings.
In the 1990s, Americans died and were injured in the first World Trade Center bombing, the bombing of
Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, the destruction of our East Africa embassies and the bombing of the USS
Cole in Yemen. The U.S. Government's response in those cases was to use the FBI to investigate. Our
government was looking for individuals to arrest, extradite and prosecute in criminal courts. President Bush
broke with that practice--and with that frame of mind-when he decided that 9/11 meant that we are at war.
He decided that the US would respond not with the FBI and U.S. attorneys, but with our armed forces and
every instrument of U.S. national power.").
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1998,"4 though he did not launch an all-out war against terrorism as did
President Bush.
Traditionally, international law was concerned primarily with relations
between states. 5 A review of the history of conflict during the twentieth
century, however, reveals that states, the entities that create international law,
have adopted a decidedly more flexible stance. Some rules governing international armed conflicts have been extended to non-international conflicts-as
in Additional Protocol H to the Geneva Conventions. 16 And it has become more
and more difficult to distinguish international armed conflicts, internal armed
conflicts and acts of violence committed by private individuals or groups. 17 It
is those latter acts of violence that are generally considered to be subject to
national laws or specific treaties governing the specified conduct, like
terrorism. But that distinction is based on the assumption that the acts of
violence are, as Article 2(2) of Additional Protocol H provides: "situations of
internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of
violence and other acts of a similar nature."' 8 Since September 11th, 2001,
there have been further brutal terrorist attacks in Bali (twice), Madrid, London,
and Jordan. It is quite clear that the conflict with al Qaeda is not an internal
disturbance, nor is it isolated or sporadic. As the Department of State advised
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, "To conclude otherwise is

14.
On August 21, 1998, President Clinton informed Congressional leaders that he had ordered
attacks on facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan connected with Osama bin Laden. The attacks were launched
in exercise of the inherent right of self-defense as a "necessary and proportionate response to the imminent
threat of further terrorist attacks against U.S. personnel and facilities," after receiving "convincing
information from a variety of reliable sources" that the bin Laden organization was responsible for the August
7, 1998 attacks on United States embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dares Salaam, Tanzania that killed over
250 people. Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Military Action Against Terrorist Sites in
Afghanistan and Sudan, Aug. 21, 1998, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES-WILLIAM J. CLINTON, BOOK I 1464 (2000).
15.

The Case of the S.S. "Lotus," (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927, P.C.I.J. (Set. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7)

("International law governs relations between independent states.")
16.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I), and Protocol;24005;24005 Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol 11), Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annexes I &;24040;24040
11,reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (Protocol 1), 1442 (Protocol I) (1977) [hereinafter Additional Protocol L1].
17.

See, e.g., International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No.

rT-

94-1-AR72, Appeals Chamber, Oct. 2, 1995, 1 97.
18.
Additional Protocol IL supra note 16, art. 2(2). For more information on the development of
international law as it relates to non-international armed conflict, see L.C. GREEN, THECONTEMPORARY LAW
OF ARMED CONFLICT 54-57 (2000); see also Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 18, U 96-127.
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to permit an armed group with strategic designs to wage war unlawfully against
a sovereign state while precluding that state from defending itself.' 9
One of the concerns raised by some about the use of the "war" construct
is that it purportedly permits killing suspected terrorists without warning and
detaining suspected terrorists without end. That characterization is only half
correct. Certainly the law of armed conflict does not require that notice be
given to an enemy combatant before he is attacked. Concerning detention,
however, detention is lawful only until the end of hostilities, not until the end
of all time. The war on terrorism is no different than any other war in that its
end cannot be predicted with any certainty. It is unlikely that the prisoners of
war in detention on both sides in 1942, 1943 and 1944-when things were
looking dark for the Allies - had any hopes of being repatriated by 1945, as
ultimately occurred.
Department of State Legal Adviser John B. Bellinger, I1, recently spoke
to the International Institute of Humanitarian Law in San Remo, Italy.2" He
emphasized there that the nation is in a war in every sense, citing the statements
of one of the July 2005 London bombers-that "we are at war and I am a
soldier in that war. ' 2 ' The one very critical distinction is that al Qaeda is not
a nation-state and the terrorists do not form the military forces of a nation-state
that is a party to the Geneva Conventions. But that distinction makes all the
difference. In accordance with common Article 2, the Geneva Conventions
apply to armed conflicts which arise between two or more parties to the
Conventions and to the occupation of the territory of a party to the Conventions.
Further, non-party powers engaged in an armed conflict may agree to accept
and apply the provisions of the Conventions. 22 Assuming al Qaeda is a
competent "power" to agree to accept and apply the Conventions, it has not
19.
Civil andPoliticalRights,supra note 7, at 4. See also Nathaniel Berman, PrivilegingCombat?
Contemporary Conflictand the Legal Construction of War, 43 CoLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 32-33 (".. . the
worldwide conflict between Al-Qaeda and the United States... would seem to fit the far-reaching definition
of armed conflict given by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia... provided that the word
'protracted' includes a conflict that is both spatially dispersed and temporally discontinuous...").
20.
U.S. Dept. of State Legal Advisor, John B. Bellinger, Ill, Remarks to the International Institute
of Humanitarian Law in San Remo, Italy (Sept. 9, 2005) (on file with author).
21.
London Bomber Video Aired on T.V., BBC NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/I/hi/uk/4206708.stm (last visited Mar. 10, 2006).

Sept. 2,

2005, available at

22.
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 32 [hereinafter Geneva I]; Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 86 [hereinafter Geneva 11]; Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136 [hereinafter
Geneva 111]; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art.
2, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 288 [hereinafter Geneva IV] [collectively Common Article 2 to the
Geneva Conventions].
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done so. Because of this expectation of reciprocal obligations and benefits, the
Conventions create an incentive to states parties to follow the rules. Providing
the benefits of the Conventions to those who violate every tenet of the law of
armed conflict simply undermines the Conventions and provides a disincentive
to abide by them.
Further, it is an affront to the men and women of the armed forces of all
nations who do comply with the laws of war to treat unlawful combatants as if
they are covered by the Geneva Conventions, particularly when such
combatants are grossly in violation of the laws of war and the principles of
international law that underlie those laws and customs.
This approach is consistent with long-standing practice dating centuries
before the Geneva Conventions came into effect. Both ancient Greece and
Rome actually followed basic rules and principles of war. But tellingly, those
rules and principles were applicable only to "civilized sovereign states properly
organized, and enjoying a regular constitution... governed with a view to the
general good, by a properly constructed system of law.... Hence barbarians,
savage tribes, bands of robbers and pirates and the like were debarred from the
benefits and relaxations established by international law and custom . . .
particularly with respect to the laws of war. 23
Likewise, in the Middle Ages, international law scholars opined that "the
laws of war are not observed toward one who does not observe them."'24 During
the American Civil War, the Code written by Dr. Francis Lieber and
promulgated by President Lincoln as General Orders 100 contained the
following provision:
Men... who commit hostilities ...without commission, without
being part and portion of the organized hostile army, and without
sharing continuously in the war, but who do so with intermitting
returns to their homes and avocations, or with the occasional assumption of the semblance of peaceful pursuits, divesting themselves of the
character and appearance of soldiers-such men... are not entitled
to the privileges of prisoners of war, but shall be treated summarily as
highway robbers or pirates.25

23.
Leslie Green, What Is-Why Is There-the Law of War? in NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES VOL. 71, 141, 149-150 (1998) (quoting 2 PHILLIPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND CUSTOM OF ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME 195,207-12,221-23 (1911).

24.
Id., at 155 (quoting GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI lib. I, cap. I[, VI, XXIII, at 142-4, 159, 272
(1612) (Carnegie trans., 1933).
25.
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (Prepared by Francis
Lieber, promulgated as General Orders No. 100 by President Abraham Lincoln, 24 April 1863), art. 82,
reprintedin THELAWSOF ARMED CONFLICTS 3, 13 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman, eds., 2004) [hereinafter
Instructions for the Government of Armies].
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As to the concept of "detention without end," the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg made clear that since the Eighteenth Century captivity
during time of war "is neither revenge nor punishment, but rather is solely
protective custody, the only purpose of26which is to prevent the prisoners of war
from further participation in the war.
As John Bellinger so aptly asked the San Remo audience, "What would
you have us do? Let them go?" The fact is that the United States has detained
and screened over 83,000 individuals in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. The
vast majority are freed shortly after initial questioning.27 There remain about
14,500 still in custody, primarily in Iraq, consistent with the Fourth Geneva
Convention provisions concerning security detainees.28 Less than 700
individuals have been transferred to and detained in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
The government has already released 245 Guantanamo detainees to twelve
countries-and, unfortunately, the government has been wrong about ten
percent of the time.29 It hardly seems to be in the interests of humanity at large
to release individuals who intend to return immediately to the fight and kill
more innocent men, women and children.
It has also been asserted that the detainees are held "incommunicado."
That statement is simply incorrect. Over 14,000 pieces of mail were processed
for the detainees in mid-2005. The International Committee of the Red Cross
has access to the detainees, over 1000 journalists have visited, over 100
Congressional staff members and over forty members of Congress have
observed the Guantanamo operations3 ° Further, there are two processes in
place to review every detainee's case to determine if there is a continued need
to detain him.3 '
26.
Green, supra note 23, at 167 (quoting The Nuremberg Judgment, 1945, HMSO, Cmd. 6964,
65, 48 (1946)).
27.

U.S. Has Held 83,000 In War On Terror, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 17, 2005.

28.

Geneva IV, supra note 22, art. 5, 27, 41-43.

29.
Bellinger, supra note 20. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Asst. Sec'y of Defense
(Public Affairs), News Transcript-DefenseDepartmentSpecial Briefing on AdministrativeReview Boards
for Detainees at Guantanomo Bay, Cuba, July 8, 2005,
available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2005 (last visited Mar. 10, 2006). Official Department of Defense
sources report that the Department has detained and screened over 70,000 individuals. Id. Only a very small
percentage, about 700 total, were transferred to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Id. About 234 of those have been
released. Id. There is evidence that perhaps a dozen or so have returned to the battlefield and continue to
wage terrorism against the United States. Id.
30.

Bellinger, supra note 20.

31.
The Department of Defense has established two processes to review the case of each detainee.
As of September, 2005, all detainees had been reviewed by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal to determine
whether they continue to meet the criteria to be designated as an enemy combatant. Over 160 detainees had
been reviewed by an Administrative Review Board, which determines whether the detainee continues to pose
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One also hears the argument that the detainees should be given access to
the United States federal court system. Yet it defies logic to give to these
detainees-whose goal is to kill innocent men, women and children in
contravention of all the most basic values of human civilization-greater rights
than are afforded by the law of armed conflict to legitimate combatants who
of war. Even some critics recognize that would be "a
become enemy prisoners
32
perverse legal result.
The United States has long been the leader in humane treatment of
detainees, reaching back to the aforementioned Lieber Code,33 which became
the forerunner of the Hague Conventions on Land Warfare. Though they are
not entitled to prisoner of war, or greater, benefits, the detainees held by United
States armed forces are being treated humanely and "to the extent appropriate
and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the
principles of the Geneva conventions. 34 Despite the shrill cries of torture and
abuse, the detainees are afforded, in practice, in this author's opinion,
essentially the basic protections found in common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions (though the official position of the United States government does
not invite comparisons to common Article 3). They are given three meals a day
that meet Muslim dietary laws, state-of-the-art medical care, the opportunity to
worship, clothing, shoes, shelter, soap and toilet articles and much more.35
Alleged abuses or mistreatment of detainees are investigated and appropriate
action is taken against the offenders.36
Certainly in the aftermath of September 11th, in the Pentagon and the
White House and the Department of State, there were debates whether the "War
a threat to the United States or its allies. Each detainee's case is to be reviewed annually by an Administrative
Review Board.

See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DETAINEES AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA,

http://www.defenselink.milnews/detainees.html

(last visited Mar.

10, 2006) (providing additional

information on processes).
32.

Berman, supranote 19, at 57 ("It would seem to be a perverse legal result if those who engaged

in combat without complying with the relevant international rules were entitled to criminal trials, with their
requirements of proof of individual acts, the presumption of innocence, and so on-before being detained
for mere participation in hostilities, while their more scrupulous fellow combatants were consigned to POW

camps without such requirements.").
33.

Instructions for the Government of Armies, supra note 25.

THE WHITE HOUSE, FAcT SHEET-STATUS OF DETAINEES AT GUANTANAMO (Feb. 7, 2002,)
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases2002/20020207 (last visited Mar. 10, 2006).
34.

35.

Id.

As of February 2006, over 25 officers and enlisted personnel had been held accountable for the
abuses at Abu Ghraib. One individual was sentenced to ten years in prison, another to eight years and another
to three. In all, more than 100 individuals have been held accountable for alleged detainee abuse through
36.

court-martials, non-judicial punishments, reprimands and/or separation from the service. U.S. DEPT. OF
STATE, U.S. HAS PROSECUTED ABUSES SHOWN IN NEWLY PUBLISHED PHOTOS, available at

http://usinfo.state.gov/dhr/Archive/2006/Feb/17-831358.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2006).
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on Terror" was the most appropriate way to label this particular armed conflict.
One concern by those who recommended a different label was, no doubt, that
use of the word "war" implies the military has the major, primary role. That is
certainly one aspect of the war on terror that is misunderstood-it requires not
just a military response, but a response by all facets of the United States and
coalition governments-diplomatic, economic, law enforcement as well as
military. This requirement for interagency and multinational cooperation in this
war is a major theme of several significant policy documents that have been
promulgated since September 11 th, 2001-The National Security Strategy,37 the
National Defense Strategy,38 the National Military Strategy,39 and the National
Strategy for Maritime Security.'
Domestically, the concept of a "war" on terror raises additional issues.
There is no clear agreement between the Department of Defense and the
Department of Homeland Security on where to draw the line between homeland
defense (the responsibility of the Department of Defense) and homeland
security (the responsibility of the Department of Homeland Security).
Additionally, the government is working to define the proper role of the
military in homeland security-will the military always have a supporting role
to civil authorities, or could it conceivably take a lead role in major incidents
that overwhelm the capabilities of the civilian first-responders?
Admiral Timothy J. Keating, the Commander of United States Northern
Command, has prepared war plans to guard against and respond to terrorist
attacks in the United States, including multiple simultaneous attacks. Admiral
Keating says the Department of Defense is "best positioned" of the eight
Federal agencies that could be involved, to take the lead. Though touted as the
41
"first ever" such war plans, that represent a "historic shift" for the Pentagon,
as recently as June 2005 the Pentagon's official position was that domestic
security is primarily a law enforcement function.42
37.

THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

(2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2006).
38.

U.S. DEPT.OF DEFENSE, THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA (2005), available at http://www.defenselink.nil/news/Mar2OO5/d20050318nds1 .pdf (last visited
Mar. 10, 2006).
39.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA-A

STRATEGY

FOR

TODAY;

A

VISION

FOR

TOMORROW

(2004),

available at

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2OO5/d2OO503l8nms.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2006).
40.

U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY & U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR

MARTIME SECURITY (2005), availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/4844-nsms.pdf (last visited
Mar. 10, 2006).
41.
Bradley Graham, War Plans Drafted to CounterTerrorAttacks in U.S., WASH. POST, Aug. 8,
2005, p. A01.
42.

Id. ("he Pentagon's new homeland defense strategy, issued in June, emphasized in boldface
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Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff clearly agrees. The day
after the report was released on Northern Command's war plans, Secretary
Chertoff noted that his office, not the Pentagon, would be in charge if the
military is deployed inside the United States to respond to a terrorist attack.
"The Department of Homeland Security has the responsibility under the
President's directives to coordinate the entirety of the response to a terrorist act
here in the United States," Chertoff said.43
This recent reporting simply reflects the very complex issues that are
related to terrorism in the post-9/11 world. The issues don't turn simply on
how the struggle is characterized. Just because the military has the people, the
equipment, the plan or even the authority does not mean that the military is
necessarily the first choice responder. Domestically, it is not. Overseas, it
depends on the situation. In both cases, though, a cooperative inter-agency
approach to the issues is required-law enforcement, economic, diplomaticalso seeking support from coalition partners and allies around the world.
Considering the United States "at war" is one approach that assists in
keeping the proper perspective on the scope of the problem and ensuring
options that are available and may be the most appropriate in a given situation
are not unnecessarily precluded. In every sense of the word, including under
the United Nations Charter, the United States was attacked by a vicious, global,
networked, organization committed to its ultimate destruction. Criminal law
tools have failed to eliminate the threat. The President is entitled, more
importantly, he has a duty, to respond with all instruments of United States
national power, including the armed forces. To do otherwise could jeopardize
the national security of the United States.

type that 'domestic security is primarily a civilian law enforcement function.' Still, it noted the possibility
that ground troops might be sent into action on U.S. soil to counter security threats and deal with major
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